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The effects of government spending on a small open economy (SOE) have attracted 
little attention in the New-Keynesian SOE literature. One exception is Monacelli and Perotti 
(2007). In this paper we extend their work in several dimensions. First, we include both asset 
holder  and  non-asset  holder  households  in  the  model.  Second,  we  assume  that  the  total 
government  spending  consists  of  spending  on  consumption  goods  and  transfers  to 
households.  Modelling  the  government  spending  in  this  way  enables  us  to  analyse  the 
responses of macroeconomic variables to different types of government spending shocks. 
Our  results  show  that  the  effect  of  different  types  of  government  spending  on  the  real 
exchange rate is different. Although, a rise in the government consumption spending leads to 
a depreciation, a rise in transfers to households leads to an appreciation. 
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There has recently been a renewed interest about the effects of variations in the 
government spending on private consumption. This topic has attracted the attention 
of  researchers  since  theory  and  empirical  evidence  suggest  opposite  effects  on 
private  consumption.  Although  empirical  studies  indicate  an  increase  in  private 
consumption after a positive government spending shock, standard RBC and New-
Keynesian models predict the opposite. Using the US data, Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) and Fatas and Mihov (2001) report that government spending shocks are 
very persistent and lead to an increase in output. Both studies also report that the 
effect of a government spending on consumption is significant and positive. Similar 
results are reported for the UK, Germany and Australia by Perotti (2002). Using a 
different  identification  procedure,  Mountford  and  Uhlig  (2002)  investigated  the 
effects of balanced budget and deficit spending shocks and find that government 
spending shocks do not crowd out consumption but do crowd out residential and 
non-residential investment. The findings of Gali et al. (2007) support the results of 
Blanchard and Perotti. 
While empirical studies report similar results about the effects of government 
spending shocks, the predictions of the standard theoretical models do not match 
the empirical results. In particular, standard RBC and New-Keynesian models fail 
to  produce  a  positive  consumption  response  and  a  positive  correlation  between 
consumption and hours worked after a government spending shock. These types of 
models consist of infinitely lived households that take decisions subject to their 
intertemporal  budget  constraint.  Due  to  their  optimisation,  an  increase  in 
government spending reduces consumption because of a decrease in the present 
value of after-tax income.
1 In other words, consumers are behaving in a Ricardian 
fashion. Fatas and Mihov (2001) argue that this negative wealth effect is a robust 
feature of the RBC models with different specifications, for example, with different 
financing options of government spending and different labour supply elasticities. 
More recent literature propose different methods to improve the limited ability of 
the  standard  RBC  and  New-Keynesian  models  to  replicate  the  effects  of 
government  spending  shocks  on  macroeconomic  variables.  Linnemann  (2006) 
shows that obtaining a positive consumption response after a government spending 
                                                 
1 The transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks are discussed in more detail in Baxter 
and King (1993), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and Fatas and Mihov (2001).  
 
 




shock  in  a  standard  RBC  model  is  possible  by  using  a  non-separable  utility 
function.  Gali  et  al.  (2007),  incorporate  non-Ricardian  consumer  behaviour  by 
including  rule-of-thumb  consumers  into  the  model  together  with  conventional 
Ricardian consumers and show that the coexistence of sticky prices and rule-of-
thumb consumers is a necessary condition for a positive consumption response after 
a government spending increase. 
Moreover, the effects of variations in government spending on the real exchange 
rate  and  net  exports  has  attracted  little  attention  in  the  theoretical  literature. 
Monacelli and Perotti (2007) is one of the exceptions.
2 First, they report empirical 
evidence  from  an  SVAR  model.  They  show  that  after  a  positive  government 
spending shock the real exchange rate depreciates in the US, Australia, Canada and 
the UK. After two years, the real exchange rate appreciates only in Canada. The 
trade balance deteriorates in the UK, Canada and Australia. In the US, the effect is 
insignificant in the short run, however, it is small but significantly positive in the 
long run (after three years). Then, they show that although SVAR results indicate a 
depreciation, standard New-Keynesian models produce an appreciation of domestic 
currency after a positive government spending shock. They call this result "the real 
exchange puzzle". They demonstrate that appreciation of domestic currency is the 
result of complete  markets assumption and separable utility  function. They also 
show that non-separable utility function can solve not only consumption puzzle but 
also the real exchange rate puzzle. 
In this paper we extend the model in Monacelli and Perotti (2007) in several 
dimensions. First, we assume that the total government spending consists of both 
spending on consumption goods and transfers to households. The rationale of our 
assumption is the launch of the massive fiscal stimulus packages during the current 
financial crisis.
3 These packages include various forms of fiscal policies: e.g. tax 
reductions, increase in government spending on consumption goods, infrastructure 
investments  and  increase  in  transfers  to  households.  Modelling  the  government 
spending  in  this  way  enables  us  to  analyse  the  responses  of  macroeconomic 
variables to different types of fiscal policy shocks. Secondly, we include non-asset 
holder  households  in  the  model.  Therefore,  we  can  analyse  how  two  different 
household groups behave after different types of government spending shocks. Our 
                                                 
2 For others see Erceg et al. (2005) and Galstyan and Lane (2009). 
3 The major economies that launched fiscal stimulus packes are the US, the UK, Canada, Germany, 
Japan, China and France.  
 
 




results show that the effects of different types of government spending on the real 
exchange rate are different.  Even though a rise in the  government consumption 
spending  leads  to  a  depreciation,  a  rise  in  transfers  to  households  leads  to  an 
appreciation. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the model is introduced. Section 
3  consists  of  equilibrium  conditions.  Section  4  outlines  the  calibration  of  the 
parameters.  We  discuss  the  puzzles  and  the  proposed  solutions  in  section  5.  In 
section 6, we demonstrate the impulse-responses of macroeconomic variables to 
different  government  spending  shocks.  In  addition,  results  of  global  sensitivity 
analysis are documented. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
The model consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived households and has the 
feature  of  limited  asset  market  participation  in  the  sense  that  a  fraction  of 
households do not have access to the asset market. We call these households non-
Ricardian  households.  The  assumption  regarding  the  existence  of  non-Ricardian 
consumers is  motivated by  Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and Mankiw (2000).
4 
Firms  produce  differentiated  products  and  set  prices  on  a  staggered  basis.  The 
monetary authority sets interest rates according to an interest feedback rule. The 
fiscal authority raises income by imposing lump-sum taxes. Government spending 
consists  of  government  spending  on  consumption  goods  and  transfers  to 
households. The rest of the world (ROW) consists of a continuum of small open 
economies  as  in  Gali  and  Monacelli  (2005).  We  also  assume  that  the  domestic 
economy (SOE) is relatively small compared to the ROW so that it cannot affect the 
ROW. On the other hand, shocks that originate in the ROW affect the SOE. 
2.1. Households 
We assume that a fraction of the households  ) (1 l -  behave in a Ricardian 
fashion,  smoothing  their  consumption  by  trading  riskless  one-period  bonds  and 
holding shares in monopolostically competitive firms. The remaining households 
) (l  do not have access to the asset market and consume their current after-tax 
income. 
 
                                                 









The objective of the households which have access to the asset markets is to 
maximise their life time utility subject to their budget constraint. We use a non-
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where  t A L ,  denotes leisure and  t A C ,  is a composite consumption index of asset 
























h a a t F A t H A t A C C C  
where  1 < < 0 a  indicates the share of imported goods in the consumption basket 
of households and  0 > h  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods.  t H A C , ,  is an index of consumption goods produced in the SOE with 


















dj j C C t H A t H A  
where  [ ] 0,1 Î j   represents  the  differentiated  goods  produced  in  the  economy. 




















di C C t i A t F A  
where  0 > g   is  the  substitution  between  goods  produced  in  different  foreign 
economies.  t i A C , ,  is the index of the quantity of goods imported from country  i  
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1 , 1 , ∫ ∫ ∫ + + F + +  
  t t t A t t A t t V P N W D T P + + + , , , =                                  (2) 
1 , + t A D  is the nominal pay-off in period  1 + t  of the portfolio held at the end of 
period  t , including the shares in firms.  1 , + F t t  is the stochastic discount factor. 
[ ] 1 , 1 + F º t t t t E R is the gross return on a riskless one-period bond that pays off 
one unit of domestic currency in period  1. + t   , t W  is the nominal wage,  t A N ,  is 
the  hours  worked  by  asset  holders  and  t A t A L N , , 1 = - ,  t V   is  the  government 
transfers to households.  t T  is the lump-sum taxes paid to the government. 
The  expenditure  minimisation  problem  of  Ricardian  consumers  implies  the 
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i  and  j   [ ] 0,1 Î , where  t H P ,  is the price index of domestically produced goods 

























e  is the 
price index of goods imported from country i  in domestic currency. Then, we can 
write  = ) ( ) ( , , ,
1
0
dj j C j P t H A t H ∫   t H A t H C P , , ,  and  t i A t i t i A t i C P dj j C j P , , , , , ,
1
0
= ) ( ) ( ∫ . 
Expenditure  minimisation  of  Ricardian  households  for  imported  goods  from 
country i  gives 
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, di P P t i t F is  the  price  index  of  imported  goods  in  domestic 
currency. Aggregate expenditure of Ricardian households on imported goods can be 
written as  t F A t F t i A t i C P di C P , , , , , ,
1
0
= ∫ . 
It can be shown that aggregate demand functions of the Ricardian households for 
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, ) (1 = t F t H t P P P  is the consumer price index. 
The total expenditure of Ricardian household is  t F A t F t H A t H t A t C P C P C P , , , , , , , = +  
and substituting into the budget constraint of Ricardian households yields:  
[ ] t t t A t t A t t t A t t A t t t V P N W D T P C P D E + + + + F + + ) ( = , , , , 1 , 1 ,  
The first order conditions of asset holders are 




























































  (5) 
After log-linearising the Euler equation of asset holders and using steady-state 
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where lowercase letters represent log deviations from the steady state. After log-
linearisation, the labour supply of asset holders can be written as  
 
 




) ( = , , t t A t A w c n -  
where,  t w  is the real wage. 
Non-Asset Holders 
We assume that both types of households have the same preferences, therefore 
j  and s  are the same for asset holders and non-asset holders. 












, t N t N L C
  (7) 
subject to the following budget constraint  
t t t N t t t t N t V P N W T P C P + + , , =   (8) 
where  t N C ,   and  t N N ,   are  consumption  and  labour  supply  of  non-Ricardian 
households respectively. 
The aggregation procedure of budget constraints of the non-asset holders is very 
similar to the Ricardian household case; therefore it is not shown in detail. 


















  (9) 
Its log-linearised form can be written as 
t t N t N w c n - , , =   (10) 


























-          (11) 
where  Y T  is lump-sum tax revenue divided by output,  , =
Y
T
TY and  CY G  is the 















Aggregate Consumption and Labour Supply 
In order to simplify the derivations, we assume that hours worked in steady state 
are the same for both types of household,  . = = N N N N A  Then, labour market 
clearance implies the following aggregate relationship for the labour supply: 
t A t N t n n n , , ) (1 = l l - +  
In  addition,  homogeneity  of  preferences  ensures  that  marginal  rates  of 
substitution of both types of household will be equalised in steady state. We also 
eliminate  steady  state  profit  by  setting  . = Q Y F   As  a  result,  steady  state 
consumptions are  C C C N A = = . Hence, aggregate consumption can be written as 
t A t N t c c c , , ) (1 = l l - +  
2.2. Inflation and the Real Exchange Rate 
We  assume  that  the  law  of  one  price  holds  for  each  good.  The  bilateral  real 










, where  t i, e  
is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency price of country i's currency) and 
i
t P   is  the  aggregate  price  index  of  country  i's  consumption  goods.  After 
aggregation and log-linearisation the real exchange rate can be written as 
t t F t p p q - , =  
where  t F P ,  is the price of foreign goods in domestic currency,  ) = ( , ,
*
t F t t F P P e . 
Then, using the log-linearised formula of CPI around a symmetric steady state 
the domestic price level and the real exchange rate can be linked through 






= ,   (12) 
2.3. Firms 
Intermediate Good Firms 
Intermediate  good  firms  are  monopolistically  competitive  and  produce  a 
differentiated  good.  Output  linearly  depends  on  labour  with  the  following 
production function  
      ) ( ) ( = ) ( i F i N i Y t t -   (13)  
 
 




where  0,1] Î i   and  ) (i F   is  a  firm    specific  fixed  cost.  Firms  produce 
intermediate goods as long as  ) ( > ) ( i F i Nt , otherwise  0 = ) (i Yt . Existence of 
the firm-specific fixed cost ensures the increasing returns to scale consistent with 
the Rotemberg and Woodford (1995). It is also possible to restrict the profits of 
firms to zero at steady state by choosing the firm-specific fixed cost appropriately. 
Log-linearised aggregate output can be written as 
) (1 = Fy n y t t +  
where Fy  is the ratio of fixed cost to output ratio at the steady state. 
Cost  minimisation  of  the  firms  lead  to  the  following  nominal  marginal  cost 
function for the firms 
t
n
t W MC =   (14) 
The log-linearised real marginal cost of a firm can be derived using equations 
(12) and (14) as 






=   (15) 
Final Goods Firms 
The representative firm, which produces the final output, is a competitive firm. 
This  firm  produces  the  final  good  using  the  intermediate  goods  produced  by 
monopolistically competitive firms. The aggregation technology of the final good 


















di i Y Y t t   (16) 
where  ) (i Yt  is the quantity of the differentiated good i  used in the production of 





























We assume that intermediate good firms set prices according to a Calvo (1983) 
framework in which only a randomly selected fraction,  , 1 q -  of firms can adjust 
their prices optimally. Thus, q  is the probability that firm  i  does not change its 
price in period t . Then firm i  sets price  ) (i P t  by solving the following problem 
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( max , , ,
0 =
i Y W i Y i P E s t t s t s t t t s t t
s
s
t + + + +
¥
- F ∑q   (18) 
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Firms that set a new price  ) (i P t  at time  , t  will choose the same price and output at 
equilibrium. 
Aggregating over  i  and taking the log linear approximation of equation (19) 
gives us the price setting equation 
Ù
+ + t t H t t H mc E m p b p ) ( = 1 , ,   (20) 
where  q qb q m ) )(1 (1 = - -  and  t mc
Ù
is deviation of the marginal cost from 
the constant steady state marginal cost. 
2.4. Monetary Policy 
We assume that monetary policy is conducted according to the following simple 
Taylor type monetary policy rule 
t t r p fp =   (21) 
where  / ( log t t P º p ) 1 - t P  is the CPI inflation between period  t  and  1 + t . The 
response of the monetary authority to inflation is governed by  . p f  
2.5. Fiscal Policy 
The fiscal authority collects lump-sum taxes,  t T . We divide the total government 
spending,  t G , into two categories; government spending on consumption goods, 
,
c
t G  and government transfers to households,  t V . Designing government spending 
in  this  way  allows  us  to  investigate  the  transmission  mechanisms  of  different  
 
 





5 We assume that the government of the SOE and that 
of  the  ROW  are  home-biased  and  hence,  only  consume  domestic  goods.  Total 
government spending is 
t
c
t t V G G + =  





t v V g C g + =  
where, 
g C  is share of consumption good spending and 
g V  is share of transfers to 
household in total government spending at steady state. Log linearised 
c
t g  and  t v  
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t g g x r + -1 =  
v
t t v t v v x r + -1 =  
where 
c g
t x   and 
v
t x   are  i.i.d.  government  consumption  goods  spending  and 
government transfers households shocks with variances 
2
c g x
s  and 
2
v
t x s . 
The government's budget constraint is 
t t T G =   (22) 
and after log-linearisation 
t Y t Y t T g G =  
where  Y G  is the total government spending to output ratio at steady state. 
2.6. International Risk Sharing 
Households, who have access to the asset markets in country i  are able to invest 
in the SOE. Therefore, equation (4) must hold for asset holders in country  i  as 
well: 
= = 1 , 1 ,
i
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5 Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) use a similiar structure to study Ramsey optimal fiscal and monetary 
policies in a closed economy model.  
 
 




Note that price of the security and security's one unit payoff are converted to 






























































































































  where  i J   is  a  constant  and  generally 
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Assumption of net initial asset position being zero for every pair of countries 
leads to  1 = i J . We take the log of equation (25) and then integrate over i  to get 
the risk sharing between the asset holders: 









  (26) 
where 
*
t A c ,  and 
*
t A n ,  are asset holders' consumption and labour supply in the ROW, 
respectively. 
3. Equilibrium Conditions 
3.1. Goods Market Equilibrium 
We  assume  that  foreign  and  domestic  governments  are  home  biased  but 
households  consume  both  domestic  and  foreign  goods.  Then,  the  goods  market 
equilibrium requires 
        ) ( ) ( ) ( = ) (
1
0




t H t H t + +∫   (27) 
where  j  is a good produced in the domestic country and  ) ( , j C t H  is the domestic 
demand for good  j ,  ) ( , j C
i
t H  is country  i 's demand for good  j ,  ) ( j G
c
t  is the  
 
 




domestic government's demand for good  j . As explained in detail in Appendix B1, 
an optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and foreign goods and the 
assumption that  h g =  implies the following aggregate demand equation 
+ + -
c
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3.2. Net Exports 












- -                                  (29) 
Log-linearising (29) gives us 
) ( ) (1 = ,t H t
c
t CY t CY t t p p g G c G y nx - - - - -  
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) (1 ) (1 =            (30) 
Equation (30) implies that the net exports of each country is zero at steady state. 
4. Baseline Calibration 
Time  is  measured  in  quarters.  Consistent  with  the  extant  literature,  we  set 
0.99 = b , implying a riskless annual return of approximately 4% in steady state. 
The inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,  , s  is taken as  3. The 
inverse of the elasticity of labour supply j  is determined according to (33). We set 
the openness parameter a  to  0.4. Febris and Winer (2007) analyse fiscal data of 
Canada in detail. We follow them while calibrating the fiscal side of the model. The 
government's share in the economy is  36.2 percent. Share of government transfers 
to households in total output is 11.2 percent. Following most of the literature the 
steady state debt to output ratio,  Y B , is taken as zero. The gross markup is set as 
1.2. Following Botman et al. (2006) we set the share of non-Ricardian households 
in the economy as  20 percent. AR(1) parameters of the shocks are taken from 












99 . 0 = b   Discount factor 
3 = s   Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
25 . 0 = l   Share of non-Ricardian households 
75 . 0 = q   Calvo parameter 
5 . 1 = p f   Coefficient of inflation in the monetary policy rule 
5 . 0 = = g h   Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 
4 . 0 = a   Degree of openness 
4 . 0 = y G   Share of government spending in output 
112 . 0 = y V   Share of transfers to households in output 
657 . 0 =
g C   Share of consumption good spending in total government spending 
343 . 0 =
g V   Share of transfers to households in government spending 
237 . 0 = cy G   Share of government’s consumption ggod spending in total output 
87 . 0 = c g r   AR(1) coefficient of the government consumption good spending 
78 . 0 = v r   AR(1) coefficient of the government transfers 
5. Reconciliation of the Theory with the Empirical Evidence 
5.1. Solving the Consumption Puzzle 
In standard RBC and New-Keynesian models, the log-linearised Euler equation 
of an intertemporal optimising household is 
( ) ) (
1
= 1 1 , , + + - - t t t t A t t A E r c E c p
s
 
In this setting, when the government increases its spending, the present value of 
the  tax  burden  increases.  A  resulting  negative  wealth  effect  forces  Ricardian 
consumers to reduce their consumption. Persistence of government spending is one 
of  the  factors  that  determines  the  present  discounted  value  of  taxes.  Lower 
persistence implies a shorter period of budget deficits, and lower negative wealth 
effects due to lower future tax burdens for asset holders. An additional transmission 
channel which affects the consumption decision of Ricardian agents is the response 
of monetary policy to the inflationary effects of government spending shocks. A 
stronger  response  of  interest  rates  to  inflation  implies  a  higher  substitution  of 
current consumption for future consumption.  
 
 




Two different routes are taken in the literature to produce a positive consumption 
response after a government spending shock. The first approach enables a shift in 
labour demand after the government spending shock via counter-cyclical mark-ups 
or non-Ricardian consumers. In this type of model, wages rise if the increase in 
labour demand is higher than the increase in labour supply and higher wages boost 
consumption. Devereux et al. (1996) and Ravn et al. (2006a) use a  model  with 
counter-cyclical mark-ups and show that wages increase if labour demand increases 
sufficiently;  hence  households  substitute  leisure  for  consumption,  as  a  result 
consumption increases. 
Gali  et  al.  (2007)  introduce  rule-of-thumb  (non-Ricardian)  consumers  with 
nominal rigidities in order to generate a positive consumption response after the 
government spending shock. Consumption of non-Ricardian household depends on 
real wages, hours worked and taxes. The real wage is determined by the dynamic 
interaction of labour supply and demand in the labour market. The labour demand 
of  firms  depends  on  the  degree  of  price  stickiness  in  the  economy.  When  the 
demand for goods increases after a fiscal spending shock,  ) (1 q -  percent of firms 
adjust their prices. On the other hand, q  percent of the firms are not able to reset 
their prices. They respond to the increased demand for their product by increasing 
output which raises demand for labour. Note that in such a situation a higher degree 
of  price  stickiness  implies  higher  labour  demand.  The  labour  supply  of  non-
Ricardian  households  is  determined  by  their  disposable  income.  If  government 
spending is partly financed by higher taxes, the disposable income of non-Ricardian 
consumers declines, hence they will want to work more. If the deficit is completely 
financed  by  issuing  debt,  then  the  labour  supply  of  non-asset  holders  does  not 
change and their consumption is determined solely by the change in the real wage. 
If the share of non-Ricardian consumers is sufficiently high in the economy, then it 
is  possible  to  obtain  an  increase  in  consumption  after  the  government  spending 
increase. 
A second approach is taken by Basu and Kimball (2002) and Linnemann (2005) 
by introducing non-separability in preferences between leisure and consumption. 
The advantage of a non-separable utility function is that it enables us to obtain the 
positive relationship between current hours worked and consumption found in the 
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In this setting, expected consumption growth not only depends on the expected 
real interest rate but also the expected change in the labour supply. Suppose our 
economy  consists  of  only  Ricardian  consumers  0) = (l .  In  this  case,  when  the 
government spending increases, due to negative wealth effects, we expect Ricardian 
households to increase their labour supply. Equation (31) ensures that the increase 
in hours of work increases consumption given the expected real interest rate. 
5.2. Solving the Real Exchange Rate Puzzle 
Structural  VAR  models  show  that  government  spending  shocks  lead  to  a 
depreciation  of  the  domestic  currency.  However,  standard  RBC  and  New-
Keynesian models predict the opposite. Specifically, the appreciation of domestic 
currency after a government spending shock is a robust feature of the theoretical 
models  which  assume  complete  markets.  The  reason  is  that  in  these  kinds  of 
models,  the  real  exchange  rate  is  determined  by  an  international  risk  sharing 
condition.  In  a  standard  open  economy  New-Keynesian  model  international  risk 
sharing implies that 
) ( =
* - t t t y c q s  
As  0 =
*
t y   in  the  absence  of  foreign  shocks,  in  the  case  of  a  domestic 
government spending shock the real exchange rate follows domestic consumption 
proportionally. Since domestic consumption declines after the government spending 
shock due to negative  wealth effects the real exchange rate appreciates in these 
models.  Inclusion  of  non-Ricardian  households  into  the  model  doesn't  solve  the 
puzzle  since  the  exchange  rate  is  determined  according  to  the  consumption 
behaviour of Ricardian households. Monacelli and Perotti (2007) report that this 
result  is  robust  in  the  presence  of  traded  and  non-traded  goods,  local  currency 
pricing and pricing to market specifications. 
Monacelli  and  Perotti  (2007)  show  that  non-separability  of  consumption  and 
leisure  ensures  the  depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  after  a  positive 
government  spending  shock.  Typical  log-linearised  international  risk  sharing 
equation  in  this  type  of  model  is  reported  in  equation  (26).  In  the  domestic 
government spending case  0 = ,
*
t A c  and  0 = ,
*
t A n . Then, in our model, the risk 
sharing equation (26) reduces to 
t A t A t n c q , , ) (1 = j s + -                                        (32)  
 
 




Equation (32) shows that the real exchange rate depends on consumption and the 
labour supply of asset holders. Negative wealth effects caused by an increase in the 
government  spending  forces  asset  holders  to  work  more,  increasing  the  hours 
worked. If the model produces positive consumption after the government spending 
shock then both  t A c ,  and  t A n ,  will be positive after the shock hits the economy. 
Then, the path of the real exchange rate is determined by the coefficients s  and 
j . As shown in Appendix B, value of j  is not independent from other parameter 









j                                                (33) 
where  0 > j . 
6. The Transmission Mechanism of Different Government Spending Shocks 
We  divide  the  total  government  spending  into  the  government  spending  on 
consumption  goods  and  the  government  transfers  to  households.
6  Transmission 
mechanism of these two fiscal policy tools are different especially if non-Ricardian 
households exist in an economy. An increase in government consumption spending 
directly  raises  the  aggregate  demand  through  goods  market  equilibrium.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  rise  in  transfers  to  households  do  not  have  a  direct  affect  on  the 
aggregate  demand.  But  transfers  affect  the  labour  supply  and  consumption 
decisions  of  non-Ricardian  households  directly.  Therefore,  existence  of  non-
Ricardian  households  makes  the  transmission  channels  of  government  spending 
shocks even more complicated. 
6.1. Impulse-Response Analysis 
We report the effects of an increase in government transfers to households and 
government spending on consumption goods in Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively. 
We  calibrate  the  standard  deviation  of  each  shock  so  that  the  increase  in  total 
government spending is 1 percent for each shock. 
Case I: A Rise in the Government's Consumption Good Spending 
Directions of the responses of total consumption, output, and employment are 
consistent with the empirical findings. Increase in output can be attributed to the 
                                                 
6 For the government consumption and investment spending cases in a small open economy model see 
Galstyan and Lane (2009).  
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t w n - + - = ,                                         (34) 
   Accordingly,  the  labour  supply  of  non-Ricardian  households  declines  with 
higher real  wages and government transfers (assuming  0 > y y T V ) but increases 
with higher lump-sum taxes. In the absence of a shock to government transfers to 
households labour supply of non-Ricardian households is determined by the real 
wage and lump-sum taxes. In the model, an increase in government's consumption 
goods spending raises lump-sum taxes and reduces wages. Therefore, both variables 
push  labour  supply  of  non-Ricardian  households,  hence  output,  up.  The  real 
exchange  rate  depreciates  and  net  exports  decline,  which  is  consistent  with 
Monacelli and Perotti (2007). Although we do not report the results, we note that 
response of net exports is quite sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported goods, h . In the model,  0.8 < h  ensures a deterioration in 
net exports. Hooper et al. (2000) report that h  varies between 0.1 and 2 in G-7 
countries. We set  0.5 = h  that is consistent with the empirical evidence. 
Case II: A Rise in Government Transfers to Households 
Compared with the first case, responses of output and total consumption are still 
positive but smaller in magnitude. Effects of rising lump-sum taxes dominates the 
increase in real wages, hence non-Ricardian households rise their labour supply. On 
the  other  hand,  Ricardian  households  reduce  their  labour  supply.  Since  labour 
supply  responses  of  different  household  groups  are  in  opposite  way,  aggregate 
labour supply increases very little. As a result, increase in output as well as total 
consumption remains limited compared to the first case. In response to an increase 
in  transfers  to  households,  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates  and  net  exports 
improves.
7 
Although total consumption rises after a government transfer, consumption of 
Ricardian  households  decline.  Cross  country  evidence  about  the  responses  of 
different types of households after a government transfers shock is limited. Johnson 
et al. (2006) report that the US consumers increase their consumption spending 
                                                 
7 Galstyan and Lane (2009) find that government consumption good spending and investment spending 
shocks lead to different outcomes for the real exchange rate.  
 
 




after  the  2001  US  Federal  tax  rebate.  In  addition,  they  report  that  response  of 
households holding relatively less assets is higher than the other households. We 
believe that further evidence is needed about the response of Ricardian households 
to government transfers shocks. 
Global Sensitivity Analysis 
We carry out a global sensitivity analysis to understand which parameters are 
more important for the stability of the equilibrium and report our results in Figure 
2.3.
8  The  shaded  area  shows  the  combinations  of  parameter  values  that  lead  to 
unstable equilibrium in the model. Our results show that calibrations of g  and  p f  
are  crucial  for  the  stability  of  the  model.  Holding  other  parameters  constant, 
coefficient  of  monetary  policy  rule,  p f ,  must  be  greater  or  equal  to  one  and 
elasticity  of  substitution  between  domestic  and  imported  goods,  h ,  must  be 
between zero and two. 
7. Conclusion 
In  the  last  decade,  many  researchers  have  tried  to  reconcile  the  empirical 
evidence on the effect of government spending on private consumption with the 
theoretical findings. However, there are limited efforts in the recent literature to 
explain  the  effects  of  government  spending  shocks  on  a  small  open  economy. 
Monacelli and Perotti (2007) is an exception. In this paper, we extend their work in 
several dimensions. First, we include both Ricardian and non-Ricardian households 
into the model. Second, we assume that a government can increase its spending by 
either raising its demand for consumption goods or raising transfers to households. 
Our interest is to analyse how qualitative comovements of the real exchange rate, 
trade balance and private consumption change with the inclusion of non-Ricardian 
households and different government spending shocks. Therefore, our purpose is 
not to fit the model results with the data but to compare the signs of the responses 
with empirical findings. In the baseline calibration, signs of the responses of output, 
total consumption and net exports are consistent with the data for both types of 
government spending shocks. The real exchange rate depreciates after a government 
consumption spending shock and appreciates after a transfer to households shock. 
                                                 








In other words, response of the real exchange rate depends on the nature of the 
government spending shocks. 
Global sensitivity analysis results show that proper calibration of the parameters 
representing elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods and 
responsiveness of the interest rates to inflation are important for the stability of the 




























Appendix A. Goods Market Equilibrium 
We assume that domestic and foreign governments are home biased. Then, the 
goods market equilibrium requires 
   ∫ + +
1
0




t H t H t   (35) 



























































= ) ( . 
Assuming symmetric preferences across countries, demand function of consumer of 
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taking the first order approximation of the equation above around the symmetric 
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Appendix B.  Steady State 
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Steady state profit, ô, implies 
P
WN
Y - = ô  
Profit to output ratio is 
PY
WN
Y - 1 = ô  
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Setting  Fy = Q   ensures  that  profit  to  output  ratio  is  zero.  Intertemporal 
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-  Assuming,  Fy = Q  in the 
steady state leads to  1 =
PY
WN . After substitutions, we can write 
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Steady state lump-sum tax can be driven using (8) and (41) as follows  
 
 









N - - ) (1 = t  
note  that  at  steady  state  C C C A N = =   and  . = = N N N A N   Therefore,  after 
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  Y T Gy - - - ) (1 = ) (1 t                                      (43) 
Equation (43) implies that lump-sum taxes to output ratio in the steady state is 
determined according to the following equation: 
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Figure 3. Indeterminacy Region p f  vs g  
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